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Despite a widespread assertion that wages are lower in the informal than formal economy, there 
have been few empirical evaluations of whether this is the case and even fewer studies of the 
gender variations in wage rates in the formal and informal economies. Consequently, whether 
there are wage benefits to formal employment for men and women is unknown. The aim of this 




To evaluate this, data are reported from a 2017 survey involving 8,533 household interviews 
conducted in Kosovo.    
Findings 
Using decomposition analysis, and after controlling for other determinants of wage 
differentials, the finding is that the net hourly earnings of men in formal employment are 26% 
higher than men in informal employment, and 14% higher for women in formal employment 
compared with women in informal employment.  
Practical Implications 
Given the size of the wage differential, the costs for employers will need to significantly 
increase in terms of the penalties and risks of detection if informal employment is to be 
prevented, along with more formal employment opportunities using active labour market 
policies for vulnerable groups, perhaps targeted at men (who constitute 82.8% of those in 
informal employment).    
Originality/value 
This is one of the first studies to evaluate the differentials in wage rates in the formal and 
economy from a gender perspective.  
 




For much of the twentieth century, the belief was that the informal economy was a leftover 
from pre-modern economies that was disappearing with economic development and the 
modernisation of governments (Boeke, 1942; Geertz, 1963; Lewis, 1959). However, for the 
past half century, the extensiveness of such work has been recognised (ILO, 2018; OECD, 
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2017; World Bank, 2019). Indeed, the ILO (2018) find that the majority (61.2%) of the world’s 
employed population have their main employment in the informal economy, with 39.7% of all 
employees worldwide in informal employment and 86.1% of all own-account workers 
operating informally. The outcome has been greater scholarly attention by economists to 
understanding this realm (Arbet et al., 2013; Bahmani-Oskooee, 1999; Carvaial, 2015; 
Dessing, 2004; Loureriro et al., 2013; McCrohan and Surgrue, 2001; Quintani and Mazzocchi, 
2015). Most studies so far have sought to understand the variable magnitude of the informal 
economy (Bose et al., 2012; Gang and Gangopadhyay, 1990; Williams and Schneider, 2016). 
Recently, however, scholars have started to pay greater attention to understanding its 
characteristics, especially who participates and their motives (Williams, 2009; Williams and 
Horodnic, 2016; Williams and Krasniqi, 2017; Williams et al., 2017). Nevertheless, many gaps 
in knowledge remain. One major gap concerns the wage rates in the informal economy 
compared with the formal economy.  
 The starting point of this paper is a recognition that despite the widespread belief that 
wages are lower in the informal than formal economy (e.g., Castells and Portes, 1989; Davis, 
2006), the evidence-base is very thin. Few empirical evaluations exist and even fewer of the 
gender variations in wage rates in the formal and informal economies. Therefore, the aim of 
this paper is to evaluate whether there are wage benefits to formal employment compared with 
informal employment and whether this varies by gender. To achieve this, the next section 
reviews the literature on what is known about wages in the informal compared with the formal 
economy, along with whether there are gender differences. The second section then outlines 
the data and methodology here used to fill this gap in the knowledge base, namely a 
decomposition analysis of data from a 2017 survey conducted in Kosovo. The fourth section 
reports the findings on whether the benefits of formal employment in terms of hourly earnings 
are greater for men than women. The fifth and final section then concludes by discussing the 
theoretical and policy implications of the findings, along with the limitations of the study 
reported and future research required.  
Before commencing, a few words are required concerning what is here meant by the 
informal economy. Reflecting the strong consensus among academics and policy makers 
studying advanced and transition economies, the informal economy covers remunerated work 
that is not registered by, or declared to, the authorities for tax, social security and/or labour 
purposes when it should be declared (European Commission 2007; OECD, 2017; Webb et al., 
2020; Williams, 2019). If there are other absences, such as no payment, or the goods and 
services sold are illegal (e.g., illegal drugs or trafficking firearms), then this remunerated work 
is not considered part of the informal economy, but are “criminal” activities, which together 
with the informal economy, constitute the wider “shadow economy” (Williams and 




For many decades, the study of the informal economy was dominated by a modernisation thesis 
which depicts a modern formal sphere in the ascendancy and a pre-modern backward informal 
realm composed of lower-paid uneducated and unproductive workers serving “bottom of the 
pyramid” (BOP) markets (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008, 2014). Although the emergence of a 
political economy perspective transcended the view of the formal and informal economies as 
separate modern and pre-modern sectors, and instead viewed the informal economy as an 
integral component of contemporary capitalism, the depiction of informal workers as lower-
paid and engaged in exploitative work has persisted (Aliyev, 2015; Castells and Portes, 1989; 
Davis, 2006). The increasing functional integration of a single global economic system is 
argued to have resulted in subcontracting and outsourcing becoming a means by which 
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employment in the informal economy has been integrated into contemporary capitalism, 
causing a downward pressure on wages and the erosion of incomes (Fernandez-Kelly, 2006; 
Meagher, 2010; Slavnic, 2010). As Hammer (2019: 344) states “economic liberalisation and 
globalisation have drawn even greater numbers of workers and firms into work that is informal, 
often pays below poverty levels and is highly insecure.” 
 In recent years, however, this common assumption in the modernisation and political 
economy perspectives that those engaged in the informal economy are necessity-driven 
workers engaged in lower paid work as a survival tactic in the absence of alternative means of 
livelihood has been questioned. Agency-oriented theoretical perspectives have emerged that 
depict engagement in the informal economy as a matter of choice rather than due to a lack of 
choice. On the one hand, a neo-liberal perspective has asserted that participants weigh up the 
costs and benefits of engaging in informal work and choose to do so when the benefits outweigh 
the costs (De Soto, 1989, 2001). On the other hand, an institutionalist theory has depicted 
participants in the informal economy more as social actors doing so when they disagree with 
the formal rules (Webb et al., 2009, 2013; Williams, 2017). In both perspectives, it is argued 
to be less clear cut whether net earnings are indeed lower in the informal economy, especially 
once one takes into account the bribes requested by public officials which act as an additional 
informal tax on formal workers, especially those working on an own-account basis (Schneider 
and Williams, 2013; Williams, 2017).          
 However, despite the voluminous theoretical literature asserting either that earnings in 
the informal economy are lower than in the formal economy, or that this is not necessarily 
always the case, few empirical studies have evaluated this issue. Reviewing the few studies, 
Tansel and Kan (2012) earlier find mixed and inconclusive evidence regarding the wage 
differential between the formal and informal economy. Their analysis indicates that evidence 
of a wage differential was found in studies between the 1980s and early 2000s, but that studies 
in the first decade of the twentieth century find either no difference or differences across 
quantiles of earnings. Over the past decade, however, a wage differential has again been 
identified. For example, Baskaya and Hulagu (2011) investigate the formal/informal sector 
wage gap in Turkey using cross-sectional data from the TurkStat Household Labor Force 
Survey for the 2005-2009 period. They find that formal employees earn significantly more than 
informal workers, even when controlling for observable characteristics. Similarly, Blunch and 
Sulla (2011) examine empirical data for 2008 and 2009 and find a large formal/informal sector 
earnings gap. Their decomposition analysis displays that controlling for observable 
characteristics reduces the earnings gap, but a substantial part of the gap remains unexplained. 
Meanwhile, using panel data from Turkey, Tansel and Kan (2012) find evidence of lower 
wages in the informal sector. However, after controlling for observable and unobservable 
effects, the gap disappears entirely. Pratap and Quintin (2006) arrive at a similar conclusion in 
Argentina, finding that the differential disappears once they match observably similar workers.  
Kehyalar et al (2018) focusing their analysis on Turkey, find evidence of a wage gap between 
formal and informal sector, but the gap is explained by differing characteristics of workers. 
However, Dasgupta et al. (2015) using data on Thailand find evidence for a systematic and 
statistically significant disparity between earnings from formal and informal employment. 
However, most of the differential is explained by observed characteristics, although about 28 
per cent remains unexplained.  
A further set of studies has recognised the existence of a dual informal labour market 
composed of what Fields (2000) refers to as a lower tier of necessity-driven informal workers 
and an upper tier of informal workers who are more likely to choose to operate informally. 
Based on this depiction, earning variations have been identified within the informal economy. 
This better paid upper tier and lower paid lower tier has been identified by Günther and Launov 
(2012) using cross-sectional data from Cote d’Ivoire. Falco et al. (2010) using panel data from 
4 
 
Ghana and Tanzania similarly find that the formal/informal earnings gap differs by the position 
in the earnings distribution. Meanwhile, Bargain and Kwenda (2014) using datasets for South 
Africa, Brazil and Mexico, find the presence of an informal wage penalty, which is particularly 
significant in the lower part of the earnings distribution but tends to disappear at the top.  Kumar 
and Ranjan (2015), using data for India for 1999-2000 and 2009-2010 reveal that informal 
workers earn approximately two times less than formal workers, but that the difference is 
greater in the upper tier of more skilled workers.  
Moreover, a recent OECD/ILO (2019) report provides evidence that women in informal 
waged employment generally face a double penalty: on average, informal wage workers are 
paid lower wages than formal workers, and women are paid lower wages than men. The 
analysis stipulates that given that women are over-represented in the lower end of the informal 
occupational spectrum, gender wage gaps are also likely to be larger in the informal than in the 
formal economy (OECD/ILO, 2019).  There have been studies that adopt Fields (2000) 
depiction of an upper and lower tier of the informal labour market, but while there exists 
evidence on the gender pay gap, few studies have adopted a gender lens when empirically 
analysing wage variations in the formal and informal economies. Given this lacuna, this paper 
aims to empirically examine the wage differences between the formal and informal sectors, for 





DATA, VARIABLES AND METHODOLOGY  
 
To evaluate whether there are wage benefits to formal employment compared with informal 
employment and whether this varies by gender, a case study is here undertaken of Kosovo. 
Kosovo is among the poorest countries in the Western Balkans. In 2017, 18% of Kosovo's 
population lived below the poverty line, with 5.1% of the population below the extreme poverty 
line (KAS, 2019). Economic growth over the past decade has not been associated with robust 
job creation in the private sector. As a result, Kosovo’s labour market is characterised with 
activity rate as low as 40.5%, with only 30.1% of working age population in employment and 
an unemployment rate of 25.7% in 2019. Kosovo’s labour market is characterized by a deep 
gender divide. In 2019, women’s employment-to-population ratio was only 13.9% compared 
with 46.2% for men, while women’s labour force participation rate was only 21.1% compared 
to men’s 59.7%. The unemployment rate was 34.4% for women and 22.6% for men, the youth 
unemployment rate was 60.3% for women and 44.1% for men while the share of the youth 
population not in education, employment or training (NEET) was 31.4% for men compared to 
34.2% for women.   
Informal employment remains a chronic feature of the labour market. The estimated 
level of informal employment by the Kosovo Labour Force Survey varies from 26.3% in 2016 
to 13.4% in 2019, which can be mainly attributed to data quality rather than any improvements 
in formalisation. A large scale and rigorous Labour Force and Time Use Survey (LFTUS) 
conducted in 2017 and commissioned by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) in 
Kosovo reveals that 34.6% of waged employees do not have a formal contract (Gashi and 
Williams, 2019), which is similar to a Reinvest survey (2017).  
Indeed, it is this 2017 LFTUS survey that is here used to assess the wage gap between 
the formal and informal economy from a gender perspective. The survey was conducted with 
8,533 households, collecting employment information on 32,742 individuals. The survey was 
cross-sectional, with data collection occurring over a 17-week period.  
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 Similar to the Labour Force Survey (LFS) conducted by the Kosovo Agency of 
Statistics (KAS), the MCC survey is aligned with the Eurostat methodology. A multi-stage 
random (probability) sampling method was used. Sampling points were drawn with probability 
proportional to population size (for total coverage of the country), population density according 
to the Eurostats NUTS II (or equivalent) and the distribution of the resident population in terms 
of metropolitan, urban and rural areas and it was ensured that on the issues of gender, age, 
region and locality size, both the national and each level of the sample is representative in 
proportion to its population size. In each selected sampling unit, a starting address was drawn 
at random and then further addresses using a standard “random route” procedure. For each 
household, the respondent was selected using the “closest birthday rule”. All interviews were 
conducted face-to-face in the national language. For data collation, CAPI (computer assisted 
personal interview) was used.  
The rationale for using this MCC survey is that it is one of the few datasets that has 
collected data on actual wages in the formal and informal economies. This data on wages is 
collected for individuals reporting that they are an employee (i.e., excluding the self-
employed). In total, 8,367 waged employees reported that they were employees, of which 32% 
(2,663) were women.  
The dependent variable used in this paper is the net hourly wage reported by employees. 
Informal employees are those reporting that they are working without a contract and are not 
declared to the tax and pension contribution authorities. A binary variable is thus included 
which equals 1 if the employee possesses an employment contract and 0 if there is no contract. 
To control for other variables that determine wage levels, three groups of explanatory variables 
are included in the model: personal and household characteristics, job characteristics and 
employer characteristics. 
The following personal and household characteristics are included, given that wage 
levels have been previously identified as significantly associated with marital status (Bardasi 
and Taylor, 2008; Datta Gupta, Smith, & Stratton, 2007; Killewald and Gough, 2013; Watson, 
& McLanahan, 2011), age and education level (Becker, 1975; Borjas, 2005), and the presence 
of children and elderly in household (Adda et al. 2017, Becker, 1975; Kleven et al. 2019, 
Cukrowska-Torzewska and Matysiak, 2018): 
• Marital status - a dummy variable for marital status is included, taking a value of 1 for 
married individuals and zero otherwise 
• Age - to assess for the non-linear relationship between age and wages, the model 
includes a variable measuring age of the employee and the age square.  
• Educational level - three dummy variables are included in the model: a group 2 dummy 
variable with value of 1 if a person’s highest completed education was secondary or 
post-secondary vocational education and zero otherwise; group 3 is set to 1 for persons 
whose highest educational attainment was a completed graduate tertiary degree, zero 
otherwise; and group 4 represents individuals that have completed post-graduate 
tertiary degree. The reference category refers to employees who have not completed 
any schooling or whose highest completed education was primary or lower secondary 
education.  
• Children - In line with previous studies, the model includes a measure for the presence 
of children, with a binary variable indicating if the household has children under the 
age of 15.  
• Presence of elderly people in household – a dichotomous variable is included 
identifying individuals that live in households with members aged 65 or older. This 
positively impacts on providing childcare for women seeking to enter the labour market 
but may also negatively impact in terms of elder care responsibilities, which in Kosovo 
is typically borne by women.   
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The following job characteristics are included, given that wage levels have been previously 
identified as significantly associated with work experience (Becker, 1975; Borjas, 2005; Rosen, 
1972; Mincer, 1974), including the number of years with an employer (Burdett and Cole, 
2010), employment status and occupation (Becker, 1975; Borjas, 2005): 
• Number of years with employer - literature suggests that wage levels are associated with 
work experience, but due to data limitations, the model includes a measure of the 
number of years with their current employer  
• Employment status - to differentiate working arrangements, a dummy variable is 
included, equal to 1 for full-time employment and 0 for part-time employment. 
• Occupation - five dummy variables are included-for managers, professionals, craft and 
related trade workers, elementary occupations and other occupations. Service and sales 
workers is set as the benchmark category.   
The following employer characteristics are included, given that wage levels have been 
previously identified as significantly associated with the characteristics of the broad sector and 
industry (Becker, 1975; Borjas, 2005): 
• Public/private sector - a variable differentiating between public, private and NGO and 
international organisations is included, the reference category being the private sector.  
• Sector - seven dummy variables for industry sectors are included: agriculture, 
manufacturing, construction, public administration, education, health and other sectors, 
with trade as the benchmark category.  
To analyse whether the net hourly earnings of men and women in formal employment are 
higher than men and women in informal employment, firstly, descriptive results are examined 
on the hourly wage rates of men and women participating in formal and informal employment. 
Secondly, these differences are analysed using the Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition statistical 
method (Blinder, 1973; Kitagawa, 1955; Oaxaca, 1973). The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
(Blinder 1973, Oaxaca 1973) is a methodology commonly utilised in the study of differences 
in labour market outcomes by groups such as by gender and age (see for example Avlijaš et 
al., 2013; Leythienne and Ronkowski (2018). This explains the difference in the means of 
a dependent variable between two groups by decomposing the gap into that part which is due 
to differences in the mean values of the independent variable within the groups, and group 
differences in the effects of the independent variable. Here, it is employed to analyse the wage 
differential between informal and formal employees.  
The following three equations illustrate this decomposition. Estimate separate linear 
wage regressions for individuals i in groups A and B: 
(1)  ln (wages Ai) = XAi βA + μAi 
(2)  ln (wages Bi) = XBi βB + μBi 
where Χ is a vector of explanatory variables (i.e., marital status, age, children, education, 
experience, sector, and occupation), βA and βB are vectors of coefficients and μ is an error term. 
Let bA and bB be respectively the regression estimates of βA and βB. Then, since the average 
value of residuals in a linear regression is zero, we have: 
 
(3)  mean (ln(wagesA)) – mean (ln(wagesB))  
       = bA mean(XA) 0 bBmean (XB)  
      = bA(mean(XA) – mean(XB)) + mean(XB)(bA – bB)  
 
The first part of the last line of (3) is the impact of between-group differences in the explanatory 
variables X, evaluated using the coefficients for group A. The second part is the differential no 
explained by these differences in the observed characteristics X. In other words, this 
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methodology divides the wage differential between formal and informal employees into a part 
that is “explained” by group differences in their characteristics (e.g., age, education, sector, 
occupation, work experience) and a residual “unexplained” part that cannot be accounted for 
by such differences in wage determinants. By “taking away” the part of the unadjusted wage 
gap that is due to the differences in the labour market characteristics of the formal and informal 
employees, the remaining part-unexplained part compares the wages of (men and women) 
formal and informal employees with the same labour market characteristics (e.g., age, marital 
status, education, sector, occupation, work experience). This part measures the “true” 
magnitude of the wage gap between formal and informal employees (Jann, 2008). Some 
caution is required in interpreting the results of this decomposition method. The unexplained 
differential in wages for the same values of explanatory variables should not be interpreted as 
the amount of the difference in wages due only to informality. This is because other 
explanatory variables not included in the regression (e.g., because they are unobserved) may 




Table 1 reveals that 35.4% of all the employees surveyed participate in informal employment 
(i.e., they are employed without a written contract or terms of employment), which is similar 
to the 39.7% of all employees worldwide in informal employment identified by the ILO (2018). 
However, there are gender variations in participation in informal employment in Kosovo. Men 
are more likely to participate in informal employment than women (39.6% of employees who 
are men engage in informal employment but just 23.5% of women employees), resulting in 
women constituting 26% of the labour force but just 17.2% of all informal employees. In 
consequence, the problem of informal employment in Kosovo is largely an issue for men; men 
constitute 82.8% of those engaged in informal employment.      
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Examining the descriptive findings regarding the net wage rates of men and women in formal 
and informal employment, Table 1 displays three important findings. Firstly, those in formal 
employment receive a higher average net wage per hour (€2.50) than those in informal 
employment (€1.40), with the net wage of those engaged in formal employment being 78% 
higher than those in informal employment. Secondly, both women and men in formal 
employment receive a higher net wage than those in informal employment. Women in formal 
employment receive an average net wage per hour of €2.50 which is 67% higher than the 
average net wage of €1.50 for women in informal employment. Similarly, men in formal 
employment receive an average net wage per hour of €2.60 which is 86% higher than the 
average net wage of €1.40 for men in informal employment. For both men and women, 
therefore, there is a wage penalty for engaging in informal employment, but the difference is 
greater for men. Therefore, the net benefit of engaging in formal employment is higher for men 
than for women. Third, and finally, although men in formal employment are paid 4% more 
than women (€2.60 compared with €2.50), the reverse applies for informal employment; 
women are paid 7.1% more than men (€1.50 compared with €1.40). The result is that women 
receive overall a 9.5% higher net hourly wage than men (€2.30 compared with €2.10) when 
employment in both the formal and informal economies are included.  
,  
Table 2 provides regression results, separately for women and men which also includes 
a dummy variable to depict the difference between formal and informal sector. This reveals a 
large wage penalty for working in the informal sector for both genders. However, the wage gap 
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between the formal and informal sectors is less for women than for men. men in formal 
employment receive 26% higher wages than men in informal employment, while the gap is 
14% for women. This implies that it is more beneficial for men to work in the formal than 
informal economy than it is for women to do so. This also indicates that if informal workers are 
rational economic actors, it will be more difficult to attract women out of the informal 
economy.  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Examining the other explanatory variables, Table 2 reveals that marital status is a determinant 
for women only: on average, compared to single and widowed/divorced women, married 
women earn 12% more. Age is a predictor of male wages only: for every additional year, on 
average, ceteris paribus, the wage of men increases 1%. Education is an important predictor of 
net hourly wages, with more educated individuals receiving a higher wage per hour. The returns 
to education are slightly higher for men. Compared to men with no education or primary or 
lower secondary completed only (the reference category), men with upper secondary education 
or post-secondary education receive 14% higher hourly wages (compared to 12% for women), 
those with tertiary receive 41% (39% for women) higher wages than the reference category 
and those with PhD receive a 60% premium (52% for women).  The presence of children under 
15 in the household does not impact on the wages of women but it positively impacts on the 
wages of men: men living in households with children under 15 were paid 3% more per hour 
compared to their counterparts with no children under 15 in the household. The variable 
indicating the presence of elderly in the household is not significant in any of the earnings 
functions.  There is a positive relationship between net hourly wages and tenure with the current 
employer, with a 1% increase in wages for every additional year with their current employer.  
Compared to private sector employees those in the public sector and those working for NGOs 
or international organisations were paid more per hour, with a larger difference observed for 
men. The hourly wage for full-time workers was higher than that for those working part-time. 
By occupations, compared to service and sales workers (the benchmark category), for both 
genders, the highest wages are observed among managers and professionals. For men, there 
are statistically significant differences across all occupations, with sales and service workers 
receiving the lowest wage per hour. Compared to the trade sector (the reference category), 
women receive higher wages in education sector and other service activities, while for men 
higher wages are observed in construction sector with no differences across other sectors 
depicted. 
In addition, to examine the wage gap between formal and informal workers, the quantile 
regressions of Mincer equations are also run, a technique that allows differentiation of the 
contribution of regressors along the distribution of the dependent variable and not simply at the 
mean, as with OLS. Empirical findings at the 25th, median and 75th quantile are shown in Table 
3 and compared with OLS main results. The results reveal that the pay gap between formal and 
informal women workers is highest among the lower paid women workers and it reduces as 
wages increase (from 0.19 for the bottom quantile to 0.11 for the top one). This suggests that 
the wage gap between the formal and informal economies is lower among the upper tier of 
women informal workers and greater among the lower tier women informal workers. The 
opposite is observed for men, whereby the pay gap between formal and informal male workers 
increases from 0.19 for the bottom quantile (the 25th) up to 0.23 for the top quantile (the 75th). 
This suggests that the wage gap between the formal and informal economies for men is greater 
among upper tier male informal workers and lower among lower tier male informal workers.   
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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To better understand the wage gap between formal and informal employment, Table 4 
reports the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition results, where the difference in the average log 
hourly wage (unadjusted wage gap) is decomposed into the explained part and the unexplained 
part. The results indicate that using a simple regression, on average, women in formal 
employment have a 55% higher hourly wage than women in informal employment, and that 
men in formal employment have a 53% higher hourly wage than men in informal employment. 
However, a portion of this can be explained by their different individual and household, job 
and employer characteristics. The finding is that 76% of the difference between log net hourly 
earnings between women in formal and informal employment can be attributed to the 
difference in average characteristics between formal and informal women employees and 49% 
of the difference between the log net hourly earnings between formally and informally 
employed men can be attributed to the difference in average characteristics between formal and 
informal men employees.  
After correcting for the different individual and household, job and employer 
characteristics of women in formal and informal employment and men in formal and informal 
employment, the results show that women in formal employment earn 14% more than women 
in informal employment, and that men in formal employment earn 26% more than men in 
informal employment. The outcome is that both men and women in formal employment earn 
more than their counterparts in informal employment, but the wage gap between formal and 
informal employment is less for women that it is for men. Put another way, it is more beneficial 
for men to engage in formal than informal employment than it is for women to do so.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper contributes to the scarce empirical evidence on the wage differential between formal 
and informal employment by displaying that both men and women in formal employment earn 
more than their counterparts in informal employment. It displays that women and men in formal 
employment earn 14% and 26% more respectively than their counterparts in informal 
employment. The outcome is that the wage gap between formal and informal employment is 
less for women that it is for men.   
This paper therefore advances theory on the informal economy in two ways. Firstly, it 
provides empirical evidence supportive of the modernisation and political economy theories 
which argue that informal employment is lower-paid activity. However, and secondly, it does 
not necessarily provide evidence to refute the neo-liberal and neo-institutionalist arguments 
which argue that it is less clear cut whether net earnings are indeed lower in the informal 
economy, especially once one takes into account the bribes requested by public officials which 
act as an additional informal tax on formal workers, especially those working on an own-
account basis (Schneider and Williams, 2013; Williams, 2017). This is because these agency-
oriented theoretical perspectives largely focus upon own-account workers engaged in self-
employment in the informal economy. This paper has only provided evidence on employees in 
informal waged employment. Whether this earnings differential between the formal and 
informal economy exists when own-account work is analysed remains open to question. This 
could be usefully investigated in future research.    
Turning to the implications for policy, these findings provide some important 
implications for tackling unregistered informal employment which is now firmly on the policy 
agenda of governments in both South-East Europe (Efendic and Williams 2018; Gashi and 
Williams 2018; Katnic and Williams 2018; Kosta and Williams 2018; Radulovic and Williams 
2018; Mojsoska Blazevski and Williams 2018) and beyond (European Commission, 2016; 
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ILO, 2015; OECD, 2017; Williams, 2019; World Bank, 2019). The finding that the wage gap 
between formal and informal employment is greater for men (who constitute as shown 82.8% 
of all those engaged in informal employment) than women is important. Until now, the 
dominant policy approach in Kosovo and beyond has been to assume that those engaged in the 
informal economy are rational economic actors who do so when the benefits outweigh the costs 
(Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). If these participants in informal employment and their 
employers are to be persuaded to transform this work into formal employment, then either the 
costs of engaging informal employment will need to be increased (by increasing the risks of 
detection and penalties) or the benefits of formal employment will need to be increased for 
workers and employers. Firstly, therefore, these findings display that the costs for employers 
will need to significantly increase in terms of the penalties and risks of detection if informal 
employment is to be prevented. Secondly, it intimates that for employees, it is the lack of access 
to formal employment that leads them to engage in informal employment, suggesting that 
active labour market policies targeted at vulnerable groups are required to increase formal 
employment opportunities. Thirdly, given that men have a greater wage differential than 
women, and constitute the majority engaged in informal employment, these policies to detect 
and sanction informal employment as well as active labour market policies to pull workers into 
the formal economy perhaps require targeting more at men if informality is to be tackled.   
Despite these advances in understanding the wage differentials in formal and informal 
employment for men and women, there are limitations to this study pointing to avenues for 
future research. Firstly, this research is on one country, namely Kosovo. Whether similar 
findings will be identified in other countries and global regions is unknown, and similar 
research is now required to evaluate whether this is the case. Secondly, this research only 
examines informal employment, not own-account work. Future research could therefore 
analyse earnings differentials in both informal waged employment and informal own-account 
work, to evaluate whether the same earnings differentials between the formal and informal 
economy, and between women and men, are identified. Again, this is required across a range 
of countries and global regions.  
In sum, if this paper encourages further research on the earnings differentials between 
the formal and informal economy, and between women and men, then one intention of this 
paper will have been achieved. If it also encourages governments to measure these earnings 
differentials in order to consider the policy initiatives and the magnitude of the changes 
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Table 1: Participation and average net hourly wage in formal and informal employment: by 
gender 
  








Net wages per hour (Eur) 
All 6239 100  2.1 
  Formal 4028 64.6 64.6 2.5 
  Informal 2211 35.4 35.4 1.4 
Women 1622 26.0  2.3 
  Formal 1241 19.9 76.5 2.5 
  Informal 381 6.1 23.5 1.5 
Men 4617 74.0  2.1 
  Formal 2787 44.7 60.4 2.6 
  Informal 1830 29.3 39.6 1.4 




Table 2: Wage regression results, for women and men 
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  1,134 3,313 
R2   0.53 0.43 
Notes: * p<0.10; **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01; for dummy variables (DV). 
Table 3: Quantile regression results, for women and men 
Women 
  Coefficient 95% confidence interval 
OLS main regression 0.14 0.06 0.21 
25th quantile 0.19 0.13 0.25 
50 quantile 0.13 0.05 0.22 
75 quantile 0.11 0.01 0.20 
Men 
  Coefficient 95% confidence interval 
OLS main regression 0.26 0.22 0.30 
25th quantile 0.19 0.15 0.23 
50 quantile 0.21 0.17 0.25 





Table 4: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for net hourly wages 
Women Coefficients Robust st. errors                z P>|z| 
Formal 0.74 0.02 38.66 0.000 
Informal 0.19 0.04 5.33 0.000 
Difference -0.55 0.04 -13.58 0.000 
Explained part -0.42 0.03 -13.45 0.000 
Unexplained part -0.14 0.04 -3.40 0.001 
Men     
Formal 0.75 0.01 60.18 0.000 
Informal 0.21 0.01 16.13 0.000 
Difference -0.53 0.02 -29.70 0.000 
Explained part -0.27 0.02 -16.72 0.000 
Unexplained part -0.26 0.02 -12.33 0.000 
Source: MCC LFTUS 2017, authors’ calculations 
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